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A NEW INDUSTRIAL POLICY FOR
THE UNITED STATES?
by Murray L. Weidenbaum

This booklet is one in a series of infoFmal talks
cleliverecl at Whittemore House, the Faculty Club
at Washington University. These lectures, sponsored by the Center for the Study of American
Business, offer a unique meeting ground for
academics and business executives to meet and discuss contemporary subjects of mutual concern.
The views expressed by the guest lecturers in tihis
series are strictly their own.

It is fascinating to see how Washington
decision makers and the coterie of private
analysts surrounding them have finally
discovered that American industry is in trouble.
Seeing one car maker on the ropes, the entire
steel industry beset with sluggish markets and
high costs, productivity stagnant and innovation
slowing down, even the trendy set in economic
policy has sensed that something is wrong in the
American economy.
Of course, many economists and business
executives have been warning the nation for
years that saving and investment-the keys
to economic growth and rising living
standards-are woefully low. Rather than
simply acknowledging these basic but
undramatic facts, it seems easier for all
concerned to adopt some new buzz words and
"in" concepts. We cynics who have an
optimistic nature nevertheless welcome this
attention to basic economic factors.
Thus, we must acknowledge that "industrial
policy" and "reindustrialization" are new and
vague terms which have rapidly become
fashionable in the United States. Many in
business applaud this new concern with business
problems, expecting-or at least hoping-that
the result will be more incentives for saving,
investment, and capital formation generally.
But industrial policy, or reindustrialization,
has also attracted another set of supporters with
rather different viewpoints. One recent union
publication, for example, lumps ''rebuilding our
industrial base" with labor's desire to "stop
plant closings." Overall, however, the situation
Dr. Weidenbaum is Director of the Center for the Study of American
Business at Washington University. This is an expanded version of a
talk given at Whittemore House on June 24, 1980.

1

today is not a simple matter of business versus
labor. It is much larger in scale. A prominent
investment banker has been urging, as a major
part of a reindustrialization effort, bringing
back the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.
For those who don't recall or are too young, the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation was an
ambitious corporate bail-out agency established
in 1932 as a gigantic, government-sponsored and
government-guaranteed investment bank.
Thus, a highly simplified but basically
accurate distinction among the supporters of
industrial policy can be made between (a) those
who want to encourage greater reliance on
private initiative and risk-bearing, and (b) those
who want to expand further the role of
government in the American economy. It is sad
to note, along these lines, tlie recent special issue
of Business Week on "The Reindustrialization
of America,'' which urged that ''the leaders of
the various economic and social groups that
compose U.S. society should agree on a program
for reindustrialization and present that program
to Washington." Shades of the recent,
unsuccessful effort to foist centralized economic
planning on the United States!
Whatever our personal viewpoint on the
subject may be, it seems clear that we will be
hearing a good deal more about industrial policy
in the months ahead. Hence, some perspective
may be useful.

To begin with, it is important to realize that
we already have many government policies
which affect industry in important ways-and
which have in large measure contributed to the
difficulties now being faced by the American
economy. In the main, of course, these impacts
are side-effects of laws designed for other
purposes. Examples include policies to provide a
more equitable tax structure, to reduce the

inequality in the distribution of income, to
strengthen the role of the trade unions, to
enhance the quality of life, to improve the
physical environment, and so forth.
Most of these policies ignore or at least take
for granted the needs and operations of the
private enterprise system by focusing on noneconomic, social goals. But, in the main, the
result of these policies has tended to be in one
direction-to weaken the basic condition of the
manufacturing sector of the economy. This
negative impact is most noticeable in the
automobile and steel industries, which have been
beset by lagging sales, rising foreign
competition, declining profits, and numerous
plant closings.
This surely unintentional weakening of the
basic structure of American industry as a result
of government policy can readily be seen in the
larger manufacturing companies as they shift
increasing portions of their work force away
from the creative and productive areas of
business such as research and development,
manufacturing, and marketing. This shift has
resulted in an increase in the overhead
functions-legal activities, accounting and
finance, public affairs, and government
relations. For the individual firm, this change
may be an essential way of responding to
pressures from government agencies and selfstyled public interest groups with noneconomic
orientations.
Moreover, this change is compounded by the
metamorphosis of the traditional functions, such
as that which can be seen in the size of
"defensive" research as a major mission of
industrial laboratories-which refers to
reorienting business research efforts to please the
regulators. Similarly, "reverse distribution" has
become a new marketing function-which refers
to gearing for, and on occasion carrying out,
product recalls. As I have pointed out in my
new book, The Future of Business Regulation,
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Where We Stand

the ultimate costs of these responses to
government dictates go far beyond the
immediate compliance expenses and extend to
attenuation of the entrepreneurial nature of the
American business firm. Hence, many of the
problems which spur the current calls for
reind ustrialization.
By overlooking these structural responses to
existing government policy, all that is visible in
the short run are the pleas for bailouts,
subsidies, and other special assistance from the
companies that are most severely affected by the
burdens imposed by government on American
industry. But, on reflection, the willingness of
government to bail out a Lockheed or a Chrysler
is not surprising. That is the price that Congress
is willing to pay to avoid dealing with the
underlying industrial problems that arise from
the existing pattern of government intervention
in the private economy.
Still another example of this pattern is the
Energy Mobilization Board proposed by
President Carter. Although Congress recently
delayed any decision to authorize its formation,
this new government agency was expected to cut
through the worst of the red tape to enable
several selected energy projects to proceed. Yet,
as some of us have been pointing out repeatedly,
the growing thicket of regulatory barriers makes
it difficult to proceed with new industrial
developments in almost any sector or region of
the economy, and not just in the energy area.
Given our national unwillingness to meet this
problem head on, the preference for a ''second
best" strategy is not surprising. But merely
legislating a few exceptions to a bad policy is
surely second best.
We must realize, in the meantime, however,
that government policy towards industry has not
always been negative. In the 1950s and 1960s,
we did in fact have a positive, albeit
unintentional, type of industrial policy. Massive
contracts from the Department of Defense,
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NASA, and the Atomic Energy Commission
helped to foster growth industries in the
aerospace, electronics, and nuclear fields, and in
many supporting industries. In a more general
way, the institution of the investment tax credit
and liberalized depreciation was a part of that
generally positive approach. In sharp contrast,
during the decade of the 1970s, we have
witnessed a burst of government regulation of
business which has been documented in detail by
our Center for the Study of American
Business-regulation which, in the main, has
had seriously negative impacts on the
performance of the American business system.

Alternative Approaches to Industrial Policy

There is no shortage of proposals for change
in government policy toward American industry.
I find it useful, however, to distinguish between
the negative policy of bailing out losers and a
more positive approach, geared to creating more
winners.
Along the lines of bailing out losers, we must
acknowledge that there is growing interest in
developing a comprehensive policy for
identifying and aiding such companies. The
concern here is to develop a "tidier" approach
than the existing one of "quick fixes." As I
pointed out earlier, some would like to bring
back the old Reconstruction Finance
Corporation, forgetting the scandals and many
charges of favoritism that led to its demise. But,
in retrospect, it should not surprise us that
arbitrary power to disperse federal largesse to
selected companies was, in fact, used arbitrarily.
If we are determined to develop a more orderly
way of providing government assistance to
companies and to specific sectors of the
economy, we have to realize that someone must
decide which sectors "deserve" the assistance
from government. There is no doubt in my mind
that this path, albeit unwittingly, leads to a
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major expansion of government power over the
private sector of the economy. Those who are
fond of citing the Japanese example might do
well to consider the sadder experiences of Great
Britain.
Variations on this negative theme of focusing
on the "losers" include restricting economic
change, such as specifically dealing with the socalled "runaway plant problem" by making it
extremely difficult and costly to move or close
down an industrial facility. This approach
ignores the reasons why companies are forced to
take such actions in the first place. So frequently
those plants have lost their competitiveness due
in large part to the government policies
advocated by the same groups that now support
legislation against runaway plants. Such
proposals also overlook the negative signals that
this policy would send out to any company
considering building a new plant in a region that
has adopted restrictive legislation (and a few
states already have done so).
Close cousins of this negative approach are
proposals to "protect" various industries and
markets from foreign competition and to inhibit
American investments overseas. A milder
variation is to beef up the existing program of
adjustment assistance for employees and
companies "adversely" affected by imports. By
providing more benefits generously to these
"victims" than to the unemployed generally,
such well-meaning responses exacerbate the
underlying economic conditions that generate the
lay-offs because such action increases deficit
spending and reduces the incentive for private
initiative.
This approach of propping up losers also
discourages business firms from making tough
survival decisions. Compare the recent actions of
Chrysler in focusing on obtaining government
aid with the earlier painful steps taken by the
management of American Motors, which instead
cut back its product line in a successful effort to
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make it on its own. From the viewpoint of
society as a whole, the negative approach locks
resources into low productivity industries and
areas of the economy. But perhaps we should
not be too critical of the Chrysler management.
After all, the company responded to a different
set of public policy incentives than did American
Motors Corporation. Any impartial observer of
the automobile industry in recent years would
conclude that there was little chance of
government providing a general bail-out to
American Motors. But because of its greater size
and strategic location, the odds for such aid
were much higher in the case of Chrysler.
The basic alternative-the positive approach
that I am advocating-is to create more positive
conditions for expansion in the economy
generally. Thus, capital and labor would be
encouraged to shift to more productive uses. My
basic theme here is to foster the economic
activities that lead to more job formation and
also enhance new international competitiveness.
There are many ways of doing that, and many
of them are mutually reinforcing.
One positive alternative is to encourage
companies to perform more research and
development, which is the seedcorn for product
and process innovation. Personally, I do not
favor more government grants and contracts
which pinpoint the specific areas to be worked
on. Rather, I urge liberal tax credits for R&D
which could yield a two-fold benefit. First,
private enterprise would determine the research
projects to be undertaken and, second, private
enterprise likewise would continue to bear the
bulk of the risk, depending on the precise
percentage of the tax credit. Also, this approach
avoids the great question that arises so often in
government-performed and even governmentsponsored R&D-how to commercialize the
results?
Often, however, the main problem is not to
develop a new business idea, but to raise the
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capital to develop it. There is a family of
proposals to do that effectively, but indirectly,
by increasing the availability of capital. One
basic way of doing this is to reduce government
competition for the limited amount of
investment funds generated by the private sector.
I mean reducing the budget deficit -especially
by cutting back those transfer payments that
reduce the incentive to work and to save. I
surely would not increase the government's
demand for funds by setting up new, off-budget
credit agencies a Ia the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation proposal.
Cutting income tax rates generally would
increase private saving and private consumption
as well. The tax cuts, alternatively, could be
targeted at increasing saving by reducing the tax
burden on the portion of income that is
saved-that is, in practice, by shifting the tax
burden to current consumption. Also, tax cuts
could promote investment. Examples include the
10-5-3 capital recovery approach which would
liberalize and simplify depreciation policies by
enabling all buildings to be written off for tax
purposes in ten years, all equipment in five, and
cars and trucks in three.
Simultaneously, an industrial policy geared to
creating more winners must reduce the numerous
government obstacles to private capital
formation, especially in the regulatory field.
Along these lines, it is important to reduce the
uncertainty about future changes in regulations
and about getting final approval by a host of
regulatory authorities for any new project. As
we saw so dramatically in the now cancelled
SOHIO pipeline case, such uncertainty
discourages investment and also increases the
cost of capital. In this regard, it is ironic to
contemplate the large government subsidies
which are being made in the synthetic fuel area
to overcome these hurdles. This phenomenon is
akin to the government simultaneously having
one foot on the brake and the other on the
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accelerator. This may also explain why my
favorite advice to congressional committees that
are considering the adoption of yet another
government program is, "Don't just stand there,
undo something.''
All of the second category of responses to
industrial policy that I have advanced boil down
to encouraging more winners. Unfortunately,
this approach is not a guarantee. In a truly
dynamic, competitive economy, we do not
know in advance where the new product
breakthroughs will occur. And the benefits will
not be evenly distributed. But we do know that
society as a whole will be better off, since it is
likely that most-but not all-industrial workers
and employers will enjoy higher real incomes
and living standards than they would under the
negative approaches. Surely, the positive types
of industrial policy are designed to enhance
productivity, capital formation, and
international competitiveness. The negative
approaches are all adverse to these important
economic goals.
Conclusion
The current discussion of industrial policy
ignores the fundamental contradictions that now
abound in government policies affecting private
industry. The worst thing that we could do,
however, is to shift from the much maligned, ad
hoc approach to a tidier and better planned
system of business bailouts. Say's Law-supply
creates its own demand-would work with a
vengeance. The assured supply of assistance
would create more demands for aid. Companies
would be more reluctant to make those difficult
choices needed to avoid pleas for government
aid. Unions would be reluctant to settle for less
if the government ultimately validates pay
increases beyond the capacity of companies to
pay.
As I mentioned at the start, much of the
current talk of a comprehensive industrial policy
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smacks of national economic planning. The
rekindled interest in such an approach is due in
part to the widespread use of planning
techniques in private business. But to talk about
"corporate planning" and "government
planning'' in the same breath disregards the
fundamental distinction between members of a
society forecasting and reacting to the future,
and the government of that society trying to
regulate or control it. Corporate planning is
necessarily based on attempting to persuade
consumers to buy a firm's goods or services. In
striking contrast, the government is sovereign,
and its planning ultimately involves the use of its
power to achieve the results it desires. Its
influence is externally oriented, extending its
sway over the entire society.
When we look at the operation of national
economic planning adopted by the primarily
market-oriented, non-Communist nations, we
find that these planning systems have tended to
shift the focus of private enterprise even further
away from dealing with market forces and
consumer demands, toward reaching an
accommodation with an ever more powerful
government bureaucracy.
Under an American version of centralized
economic planning, a company might find it
desirable to shift resources from conventional
marketing activities to convincing the
government to adopt more generous production
targets for its industry. Thus there might be less
payoff from traditional consumer market
research than from new efforts to persuade the
government to treat the industry more
favorably. Such public sector ''marketing''
activities would be a low priority use of business
resources from the viewpoint of society as a
whole. Yet, given the incentive of any
organization to grow and prosper in the
environment it faces, this result would not be
surprising under a system of strong national
economic planning and centralized decision

making. The Chrysler loan case furnishes a
cogent example, since the management of
Chrysler will have to negotiate with the federal
government not only the models to be offered,
but also the options included on those models
with their federal benefactors.
Boiled down to its essence, business planning
is part of a decentralized decision making
process in which individual consumers make the
ultimate choices. National planning is a
centralized process in which the key economic
decisions are made in the form of government
edicts. The greatest danger of adopting a form
of centralized economic planning under the guise
of a comprehensive industrial policy is that it
will-perhaps unintentionally at first, but
inevitably as its initial results prove
disappointing-propel the society away from
market freedoms and toward greater
governmental controls over individual behavior.
A cynic might well conclude that the optimum
amount of change in industrial policy is zero.
That is, the positive approaches that I have
advocated are not very likely to be adopted; the
negative approaches that involve further
government planning of and intervention in the
direction of the economy will turn out to be
more popular. But, given the alternatives, I
remain a patient optimist, hoping that some
modest contribution to capital formation,
productivity, and innovation will result from the
renewed interest in facing the nation's economic
problems.
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